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Abstract 
Sharing economy businesses are increasingly 
important, but the relationships between their 
strategies and their platforms’ structure has received 
insufficient attention. To address this gap, we develop 
testable hypotheses building on following 
expectations. 1) Sharing economy businesses are 
attacking mature markets; 2) most sharing economy 
businesses follow one of Porter’s two basic strategies, 
seeking a price advantage or a differentiation 
advantage; and 3) platforms that support 
differentiation-based strategies must provide more 
information to their users than platforms that support 
cost-based strategies.  We located a database of 100 
investment-grade sharing economy businesses to test 
our hypotheses. Our hypotheses received strong 
support from this database. 
1. Introduction  
The recent impact of sharing economy businesses 
cannot be missed.  You can now share everything you 
own with a total stranger, from your car and your spare 
bedroom to a home-prepared dinner around the world.  
The sharing economy allows you to share physical 
durables, of course; the best-known examples, Uber 
and Airbnb, allow you to share the use of your car or 
the use of your home, for a fee.  A broader view of the 
sharing economy would include what we term the 
participatory economy [24]. Well-known platforms 
like TaskRabbit involve creating a spot market for 
individuals willing and able to perform simple tasks.  
While this does not involve sharing durable physical 
goods in the same ways that Uber and Airbnb do, we 
believe that these participatory economy platforms can 
be considered examples of the sharing economy. 
Platforms vary enormously in the amount of 
information that they present to individual users, in the 
search facilities they offer users to identify service 
providers, and in the degree of choice that they allow 
individual users in selecting specific service providers.  
We believe that those differences are not random, and 
that differences in the levels of information provided, 
in the filters for selection, and in the degree of choice 
supported all reflect underlying differences among the 
strategies pursued by the platform operators. 
We chose to study this topic for several reasons.  
First, platform-based business is increasingly 
important. Although the impact of platform-based 
business is now universally acknowledged, there is as 
yet no sound and generally accepted theory that will 
predict when platforms will succeed or how platforms 
should be structured to facilitate adoption and success.  
That is not to say we do not understand user interface 
considerations for platform design when we fully 
understand the functions to be supported. Rather, it 
suggests that we do not yet understand what 
information is required, what degree of trust is 
required, and what degree of user choice is required to 
ensure success in a platform-based business. 
Second, the sharing economy is increasingly 
important. Major manufacturers need to understand 
when their products are sharable and how that will 
affect demand. Traditional intermediaries need to 
understand when their owned-inventory model 
represents higher cost, or more limited choice, and is 
unsustainable. In order to assess the chances for future 
success, entrepreneurs and investors need to 
understand when it is possible, even easy, to attack an 
existing market, and when it is difficult. It would be 
extremely useful to have a strong predictive theory for 
assessing the potential success for sharing economy 
platform-based businesses (SEPBs).  
Moreover, it is now possible to perform at least 
some statistical analyses on sharing economy 
platform-based businesses. There are now well over 
100 SEPBs that have received rounds of private equity 
funding. Many of these are reviewed in a range of 
publications, and there is financial data or investment 
history data available for many of them as well. 
To address the research gap discussed above, we 
started with an in-depth analysis of four well-known, 
well-funded, widely used, and generally successful 
SEPBs. Among these four SEPBs, we observed pat-
terns for which we believe there are sound theoretical 
explanations. We used abductive reasoning and these 
explanations to generate our hypotheses. The process 
of hypothesis generation is described in more detail in 
the methodology section.  The hypothesis examine 
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relationships between the strategy of the SEPBs and 
the structure of their websites, and between the strat-
egy of the SEPB and the structure of the marketplace 
they are seeking to enter.  We call these internal and 
external consistency. 
In this paper, we test our hypotheses using a data 
set of SEPBs. The data set was selected by Drew Men-
tock, writing for Money Nomad, an online journal 
(http://www.moneynomad.com/about) aimed at inves-
tors who hope to succeed with strategies involving 
online businesses.  Since this is not an academic jour-
nal, we did not base any part of our analysis upon the 
content of the article; we merely used the article to pro-
vide a list of websites.  Since this data set was com-
piled based on the Mentock’s assessment of the SEPBs 
attractiveness to investors, it should represent a sample 
of businesses with above average chances of success. 
That is, we are studying businesses that are considered 
to have made better than average decisions in design 
and in strategy. Since this data set was selected by oth-
ers, it should be free of the sort of sample bias that 
might have been introduced, even unintentionally, if 
we were allowed to select those candidate businesses 
we choose to study.  We show that successful SEPBs 
do share several characteristics in common, including 
attacking newly vulnerable markets and matching 
their website structure to their strategies. 
2. Literature Review   
In an era of information-based micro segmentation, 
Porter’s generic business strategies of cost-based or 
differentiation-based leadership [21, 20] no longer 
represent a binary classification nor is each company 
represented by one or the other of the two alternatives.  
Individual products can be located in any position on 
the continuum between cost and differentiation that is 
economically feasible for production. Multi-product 
firms can embrace a complex set of positions on this 
continuum. 
Still, it seems likely that any single platform-based 
offering will represent either a focus on cost or a focus 
on differentiation. This seems plausible at this time, in 
part because the sharing economy is newer than other 
markets for products and services, and less crowded, 
so that simpler strategies may remain effective.  Larger 
SEPBs over time may develop a portfolio of offerings, 
which may embrace a range of strategies. With the 
assumption that start-up SEPBs can be classified as 
either competing with a focus on cost or with a focus 
on differentiation, we use Porter’s two generic 
strategies to represent one dimension of our analysis 
of digital platforms. We classify strategies of the 
SEPBs using Porter’s classification, and study to 
understand which of these strategies determine the 
structures of these firms.  Since the classification 
produced statistically significant results, we deem it 
acceptable at this stage of development of the sharing 
economy. 
There is a large literature in corporate strategy and 
organizational design, going back to Chandler [5], that 
argues that the structure of a firm is determined by its 
strategy. The earliest examples suggest that a firm 
with a multi-business strategy (like Sears & Roebuck) 
or a multi-product strategy (like GM) will have 
multiple divisions. More recently, firms (like Apple), 
which focus on design and product innovation but not 
component innovation, have internal capability for 
design and marketing but virtually no internal 
manufacturing capability.  
We argue throughout this paper that strategy of a 
SEPB drives the structure of its website and the user 
interface, and not merely the structure of the firm.  
This is tested in our hypotheses. 
2.1 Theory of Newly Vulnerable Markets 
Newly vulnerable markets provide a theory to explain 
and understand changes in competition, in which new 
competitors are able to attack stronger incumbents, 
even in what look like mature industries.  Digital 
platforms have changed the landscape of competition 
in a number of industries. SEPBs are by definition 
attacking markets in which the sharable assets are 
sufficiently broadly held by individual consumers. 
The theory of newly vulnerable markets (NVM) 
[8] assesses whether an industry is vulnerable to new 
entrants. It builds on the theory of contestable markets 
[3], which posits that in monopolies or oligopolies that 
are under continuous threat of new entry, prices would 
be similar to perfect competition to eliminate the 
incentives of new entrants to enter the market because 
of zero profits. In contrast, oligopolies and monopolies 
that are not contestable do exhibit some degree of 
monopoly profits. 
The theory of NVM depicts three conditions to 
determine market vulnerability. First, the market 
needs to have become newly easy to enter. This occurs 
when technological or regulatory changes reduce the 
entry barriers or when changes in consumer 
preferences weaken the competitive advantage of 
previously dominant firms. Cellphone service 
destroyed the old AT&T because technology made it 
possible for new entrants to offer telephony service 
that could interact with all other phones regardless of 
their networks, while regulation made it possible for 
new firms to compete and, changes in consumer 
preferences made wireless telephony preferred over 
traditional landlines. 
Second, the market must be attractive to attack.  
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This implies the presence of a strong customer 
profitability gradient. This usually occurs when 
existing firms in an industry charge the same prices to 
all customers, even when customers differ 
substantially in willingness to pay for goods and 
services, or in their costs to serve.  New entrants may 
target the most lucrative consumers, for example, the 
air travelers who are easiest to serve, or the banking 
customers who pay the highest finance charges each 
month because they maintain large unpaid balances. 
Third, the market must be difficult to defend.  This 
occurs when the incumbents experience barriers in 
changing their strategy to imitate the attacker’s 
strategy.  
The theory has been used in a variety of case 
studies, including the credit card industry [9] and the 
electronic travel distribution services [14]. Using 
NVM as a predictor of success, we investigate whether 
the markets, where the SEPBs have entered, are newly 
vulnerable, which would suggest that they have 
selected markets with a high probability of success. 
2.2 Theory of Resonance Marketing 
The theory of resonance marketing [6] explains that 
companies that now seek full differentiation and 
delight-based strategies are dependent upon the 
amount of information that customers have. In pure 
resonance marketing strategies, the information is 
provided by the environment, not by advertising, a 
condition called organic informedness [7]. We believe 
that SEPBs that follow a delight-based strategy, 
offering the individual user an ever-changing array of 
choices to satisfy every want or need, will need to 
provide that informedness themselves, since users will 
not be familiar, for example, with each individual 
property offered in Paris, or each amateur chef willing 
to prepare meals in Bangkok. The theory of resonance 
marketing suggests that the information-based 
structure of the SEPB website will need to follow the 
strategy selected for the business. 
The theory of resonance marketing argues that the 
compromise discount creates an uncertainty discount 
in the presence of uncertainty about a product’s true 
location in its product attribute space. The more 
uncertain a consumer is about a product that is ideal 
for him or her, the greater the range of unacceptable 
things the product could turn out to be, and thus, the 
more truly inferior locations that product could 
occupy. As uncertainty is reduced, also the range of 
inferior possibilities is reduced, and the smaller the 
expected compromise discount becomes. As the 
expected compromise discount decreases, consumers’ 
willingness to pay eventually approaches the user’s 
full valuation for any individual offering. 
The work in resonance marketing that is most 
relevant to our current study shows that companies 
that want to follow a strategy based on delighting 
consumers must be aware of the uncertainty discount, 
and find mechanisms for reducing uncertainty [16, 
12]. 
2.3 Sharing Economy and Platforms  
The current understanding of the sharing economy, 
while very different from its original meaning in 
anthropology [22], typically refers to new assemblages 
or hybrids of economic modalities enabled by digital 
technologies and platforms. Habibi et al. [15] position 
sharing economy on a continuum between pure 
sharing and pure exchange. Sundararajan [24] defines 
the sharing economy as platforms engaged in crowd-
based capitalism mixing gift and market economies. 
Likewise, Constantiou et al. [10] describe sharing 
economy platforms as mixing organizational with 
market coordination mechanisms. Sharing economy 
platforms are also viewed as multi-sided; they 
facilitate the transactions between different parties 
who would not necessarily transact otherwise [19]. 
These descriptions have much in common, but they 
have slight differences in emphasis that we need to 
clarify in order to understand the hypotheses and the 
SEPB classifications in this paper. 
For the purpose of our research, we define SEPBs 
as platforms that facilitate the peer-to-peer allocation 
of temporary access to idle resources that are owned 
by individuals rather than corporations. In particular, 
our definition reflects the motivations and benefits 
generally ascribed to the sharing economy. First, the 
sharing economy allows consuming without buying, 
which enables consumption at lower costs [18]. 
Access over ownership refers to the temporary use of 
consumer goods without a transfer of ownership [23]. 
Second, peer-to-peer networks enable direct transac-
tions between individuals and complement traditional 
business activities [2]; the sharing economy is differ-
ent from prior business-to-consumer rental services. 
Peer-to-peer networks do not involve intermediaries 
and are based on trust and reputation [1]. Third, the 
allocation of idle resources allows for lowering costs 
of their access and also for more sustainable resource 
consumption [23, 25].  
None of these three developments is new or 
exclusive to the sharing economy. However, with the 
rapid diffusion of digital infrastructures, platforms, 
and end-user devices, these developments have 
opened up new opportunities for value creation and 
commercial success. As demonstrated by Uber and 
Airbnb, SEPBs utilize such opportunities to their 
advantage as they enter mature markets and attack 
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global and local incumbents alike [11].  
The impact of sharing economy platforms on 
market dynamics is not yet fully understood. We can 
only draw on first, tentative insights and findings. For 
instance, Weber [26] suggests that incumbents 
offering high-cost goods may actually benefit from 
sharing economy markets, since sales of expensive 
items may be increased if the purchaser can recover 
some of the cost through shared access.  
3. Empirical Study  
Given the lack of empirical research and theoretical 
elaborations relating the strategy of sharing economy 
business to the structure of its online platform, we 
began our research following an exploratory case 
study research design.  As noted by Yin, this is 
intended to develop propositions for future research 
[27]. Our case study research design and practice 
followed established guidelines for operations and IS 
research [13, 4] inasmuch as we 1) purposefully 
selected cases, which promised to reveal rich, in-depth 
data, 2) formulated research questions to focus our 
analysis, and 3) conducted within-case and 4) cross-
case analysis. We present the findings of the case 
studies as hypotheses followed by the results of their 
statistical testing. 
3.1 Generation of Hypotheses 
As noted above, we started by using a small set of 
semantically rich case studies to develop theory 
followed by a set of hypotheses for the next stage of 
our study [17]. We studied Uber and Lyft in the ride 
hailing / ride sharing market; and Airbnb and Home 
Away as examples of temporary accommodations in 
the sharing economy, all of which are generally agreed 
to have been successful.   
We observe that for these four SEPBs, business 
strategy drives platform structure and note that they 
have some attributes in common:  they each follow one 
of the two classic strategies, defined as canonical 
strategies by Porter [21].  Uber and Lyft follow cost-
based strategies; and Airbnb and Home Away follow 
differentiation-based strategies.  Of course, Uber and 
Lyft, Airbnb and Home Away, are neither products 
nor services; they are distribution channels for 
services.  When we say that Uber and Lyft for cost-
based strategies we mean that the services they offer 
are less expensive than taxi services.  When we say 
that Airbnb and Home Away follow differentiation-
based strategies we mean that the services they offer 
seek to provide resonance and delight. 
More interestingly, however, these four platforms 
adopt one of two very different structures. The two 
platforms that follow a cost-based strategy offer a 
simple website/app that provides the user with very 
little choice and thus require very little information. 
An Uber user is simply informed about his driver, his 
driver’s car, his driver’s identifying information, and 
enough information on the driver’s rating to ensure a 
minimal level of trust and acceptance. Any further 
information, or any greater degree of user-interaction, 
would simply slow the operation of the ride matching 
service with no appreciable gain in user satisfaction.  
In contrast, the two platforms that follow a 
differentiation-based strategy offer robust information 
allowing the user to make a fully informed decision 
about which property to rent. The absence of 
information about location, size, condition, 
furnishings, accessories, internet access, and 
convenience to public transportation, would reduce 
potential guests’ willingness to rent and reduce their 
willingness to pay. As we know from research on 
informed differentiation-based strategies [7], buyers 
don’t just want the average of all reviews; they often 
want to examine the entire text of reviews.  
Differentiation-based strategies involve consumers 
who are seeking delight [9] and in those cases 
consumers must be presented with a sufficient amount 
of information in order to ensure that delight. 
Thus, we note that differences in platform strategy 
result in differences in platform structure reflected in 
the way information and choice is offered on the 
respective website (for reasons of expediency, we 
subsume apps under the term “website”). This is the 
basis of our first set of hypotheses regarding strategy, 
structure, and information (H1A - H1C and H2). 
H1A — If the SEPB is following a differentiation-
based strategy it will provide robust information on 
individual services or service providers.   
Often this information is required to allow the 
users to choose which service or provider s/he wishes, 
which will generate the highest degree of delight.  
Alternatively, when the differentiated service requires 
speedy execution, choice may not be possible. We 
expect differentiation-based strategies to require 
robust information, without needing to allow the users 
to make choices. This robust information is necessary 
to enable the user to believe that the offering selected 
for him or her will provide the required level of 
delight. Again, we refer to earlier work on the 
relationships among information, trust, and resonance 
marketing [6].  
H1B — If the SEPB is following a cost-based 
strategy it will provide far less information on 
individual services or service providers and will not 
allow the users to choose which service or provider he 
wishes.   
Most cost-based SEPBs do not seek to provide 
resonance and delight, do not need to allow users to 
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make choices, and therefore do not need to provide the 
users with robust information. 
H1C — If the SEPB is following a cost-based 
strategy, but for goods and services that might be 
considered risky, it will provide robust information on 
individual services or service providers. Even when 
the platform will not allow the users to choose which 
service or provider s/he wishes, it will provide enough 
information for the user to make an informed decision 
about whether or not to proceed.   
We generated hypothesis H1C after considering 
the conditions under which we would allow a young 
child or an elderly person to be assigned to a ride 
service, and concluded that we would need far more 
information than for example Uber or Lyft currently 
provide before we would accept their selected car and 
driver, even if we did not require the ability to select 
the car and driver ourselves. 
H1A through H1C test for internal consistency, 
and a match between strategy and structure, for three 
separate types of service.  H2 tests the entire data set 
for internal consistency. 
H2 — Those SEPBs that were promising enough 
to capture the attention of the creator of our data set 
will have structures that match their strategy. 
H1 suggests the ways in which strategy should 
drive structure. H2 suggests that websites considered 
promising to be included in the list of investment grade 
websites will indeed have strategy driving structure.  
We also noticed that all four platform businesses 
that we studied in-depth (i.e. Uber, Lyft, Airbnb, 
Home Away) are attacking existing mature 
marketplaces. The markets for local transportation and 
for short term rental accommodations are both multi-
billion dollar industries, and both have existed in one 
form or another for centuries. Although all four SEPBs 
are attacking existing marketplaces for existing goods 
and services, we note that they all are attacking what 
we consider to be newly vulnerable markets. First, for 
the sharing economy to function, the goods in question 
must be sufficiently widely held for there to be enough 
in circulation for them to be shared. Additionally, if 
the platform is attacking a market for goods or services 
that are already widely held, the platform creators and 
their investors should want to have a strong reason for 
expecting success when attacking an existing market.  
The theory of NVM offers a sound and tested theory 
for predicting and explaining success.H1 and H2 led 
to the formulation of Hypotheses H3 through H5. 
H3 — SEPBs will attempt to attack NVMs. 
H4 — Successful SEPBs will be those that have 
attacked NVMs. 
H5 — Successful SEPBs will be those that have 
attacked NVMs with structures that match their 
strategies.  
3.2 Analysis of a Database of SEPBs  
We analyzed a set of 104 SEPBs that were considered 
to be investment grade opportunities by Money 
Nomad.1 We used this curated list because it was large 
enough for statistical analyses, because the businesses 
included were considered high quality SEPBs, and 
because the SEPBs in the list were selected by 
someone outside our group, without awareness of our 
hypotheses. Together these conditions ensured that the 
websites were relevant to our study but were not 
selected because of conscious or unconscious biases, 
or by a desire to examine websites that supported our 
hypotheses.   
We classified all 104 SEPBs on a number of 
dimensions, looking at the descriptions of the 
businesses in the article, the companies’ own websites, 
the descriptions of the businesses available in the 
popular press and the investment community press, 
and Facebook and Yelp contents as available.   
First, we checked to see if the business was still 
operating. A business that had been acquired by 
another sharing economy platform and merged was 
studied as part of the new business and not as an 
individual case. In contrast, a business that had been 
acquired by an unrelated business but was continuing 
to operate was included and studied in the context of 
its current operations. A business that had failed and 
closed was dropped from inclusion in our study, since 
we are trying to make predictions about the strategy 
and structure of successful SEPBs. 
Next, we checked to see if we could consider the 
business as an SEPB. In line with our definition of 
SEPBs, we restricted our analysis to businesses that 
increased the size of the market by bringing new 
providers of goods and services into the marketplace, 
where those new providers were not professionals in 
the same sense as existing market participants. Using 
our definition, Uber and Lyft are both sharing 
economy businesses. An aggregator or an integrated 
search engine, that for instance functioned as a 
citywide dispatch service for all taxi companies, or 
created a travel marketplace like Orbitz, would not 
have been considered as an SEPB and would have 
been dropped from our study. We considered 
businesses that increased the size of a market by 
creating a spot market for access to individuals on a 
short-term basis, and defined these as participation 
economy businesses. As noted above, we decided to 
include participation economy businesses in our 
sample of SEPBs even if they did not involve sharing 
physical goods. 
We then began classifying each identified 
company on several dimensions. We first determined 
if the business was cost-based or differentiation-based.  
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Often this was clear from the websites of Money 
Nomad and the company itself. If necessary, we went 
to additional sources, but were always able to 
determine the principal strategy of the website and the 
business. 
We next determined if the SEPB was attacking a 
newly vulnerable market or not. If there was a mature 
existing market, and if there was a customer 
profitability gradient that facilitated targeting specific 
customers online, and if there were structural reasons 
why incumbents could not immediately duplicate the 
strategies of successful attackers, then all necessary 
conditions of a newly vulnerable market were 
satisfied.   
Third, we explored by examining the websites’ 
user interfaces whether or not it was providing a 
limited or a robust set of information to its users.  
There is a continuum ranging from very little 
information to a description, photographs, maps, and 
testimonials, but all authors were able to agree on all 
of the classifications. (See Appendix A for an example 
of robust information.)  
Fourth, we explored whether the website provided 
users with a single recommendation, which the user 
could accept or reject, or whether the website offered 
the user a range of choices. Also this classification 
required examining websites and their user interfaces. 
The final classification we performed was 
determining how to assess a SEPB as successful or 
not. In most cases, this was the most complex part of 
our analysis. In the case of international giants like 
Uber and Airbnb the determination was easy. For 
small startups, there is no single definition of success 
of the SEPB. We agreed to consider a business 
successful if it had at least three successful rounds of 
venture capital or private equity financing; or, it had 
raised at least $1 million in venture funds; or, it 
operated in at least three countries or at least 10 cities; 
or, it had at least 100,000 users or at least 10 thousand 
service providers; or, it was currently operating at a 
profit. 
When we could not conclusively demonstrate a 
criterion as satisfied we needed to proceed as if the 
criterion was not satisfied. Even though this set of 
criteria might be considered as too inclusive, we found 
that a large subset of our database could be classified 
as successful. 
The full data set we used, along with our 
classification of each of the entries and the reasons 
behind our classification, is available as Appendix B.   
4. SEPB Strategy and Structure  
Hypotheses H1A through H1C and H2 test the 
internal consistency of the website. We examine each 
SEPB website to determine if the information it 
displays is consistent with its choice as a provider of 
differentiated goods and services or as the provider of 
low cost goods and services. We also verify that the 
information it displays is consistent with the users’ 
perceived risk profile associated with the goods and 
services the website offers. We divide the SEPBs 
based on their strategies simply into firms that 
compete as a low cost / low price provider, and firms 
that compete as a value-added provider of 
differentiated products and services [21, 20]. 
Table 1 shows a classification of the 67 surviving 
SEBPs, which constitute the sample we use for the 
statistical tests. Surviving SEBPs are those that are still 
independent businesses, are still operating at the time 
that we completed our analysis, and which are part of 
the sharing economy as we defined it (i.e. including 
participatory economy SEPBs). The first classification 
of the sample is according to both their strategy and 
whether or not users are empowered to make 
selections among alternative service providers. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of surviving SEPBs 
 
Strategy  




No Choice 21 (95,5%) 1 (4,5%) 22 
Choice 4 (8,9%) 41 (91,1%) 45 
Total  25 42 67 
  
Table 2 displays the classification of SEPBs based 
on strategy and information provision. A chi-square 
test of independence was performed to examine the 
relation between SEPB’s strategy and information 
provision to the platform participants. The result was 
significant (X2 (1, N = 67) = 40,226, p <0,01) and 
supported H1A and H1B. SEBPs following a cost- 
based strategy are less likely to provide robust 
information to the participants, while SEBPs 
following a differentiation-based strategy are more 
likely to provide robust information to the participants. 
Table 2. SEPBs strategy and information provision 
We realize that there are factors other than 
differentiation-based strategy that might require the 
provision of additional information. When considering 
extensions to Uber’s basic ride service, letting a 
stranger delivery your restaurant meal seems even less 
risky than getting in the stranger’s car, so we would 
expect the level of information about the driver on 
websites for food delivery to be similar to the level of 
 
Strategy  





20 (90,9%) 2 (9,1%) 22  
Robust 
Information 
5 (11,1%) 40 (88,9%) 45 
Total  25 42 67 
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information for the driver of your ride. In contrast, we 
might want a lot more information about the driver 
before we would feel comfortable letting him or her 
drive a small child to day care. Table 3 augments the 
analysis of table 2 and now includes an analysis of 
cost-based services where the user might perceive a 
higher degree of risk. We expect to see that the amount 
of information provided to users would be higher, 
whether or not users are allowed to select among 
individual service providers.  
 The result was significant (X2 (2, N = 67) = 
43,249, p < .01) and supported H1C and H2. 
























1 (2,2%) 40 (88,9%) 45 
Total  24 1 42 67 
SEPBs following a cost-based strategy are less 
likely to provide robust information to the participants 
in the absence of risk to the user. In contrast, SEPBs 
that follow a differentiation-based strategy and those 
that follow a cost-based strategy that users perceive as 
involving risk are both more likely to provide robust 
information to the participants.  
5. SEPB as an Attack on Newly Vulnerable 
Markets 
The three hypotheses (H3-H5) address the extent to 
which the business is attacking a marketplace in which 
there should be a rational expectation for success. 
We use the theory of NVM as a plausible basis for 
expecting success when entering a market for goods 
and services that have existed for decades, or even for 
centuries. Newly vulnerable markets require three 
attributes, as described above. First, we find that the 
principal purpose of an SEPB platform is to exploit a 
new technological opportunity that made a market 
newly easy to enter. 
The principal function of markets is pooling buyers 
and sellers with sufficient liquidity to allow 
transactions to match and trades to occur. This in turn 
allows markets to determine market clearing prices.  
Historically markets existed in a fixed place, so that 
buyers and sellers could congregate to trade, and; they 
were often for relatively simple tradeable items, which 
could therefore be traded without the need for 
extensive physical inspection.   
Increasingly, online markets exist where both of 
these attributes are absent. When guests rent a space 
via Airbnb they are often time zones and even oceans 
removed from the renters who provide their space; 
they are not meeting in a single space. Likewise, when 
users hail a ride from Uber or Lyft they are seldom 
able to see their driver or the vehicle; no physical 
inspection is possible beforehand. Since both 
historical constraints can be removed, this suggests 
that there are now markets that are newly easy to enter. 
However, newly vulnerable markets must also be 
attractive to attack. This usually occurs when there is 
a customer profitable gradient, when some customers 
are demonstrably more profitable to serve and these 
customers can be identified, targeted, and captured as 
customers for the new attacker. 
The existence of the profitability gradient for each 
of these SEPB’s customer-bases is more complicated 
to demonstrate. For Uber X, we were able to show that 
these customers are profitable because drivers do not 
have to wait or cruise, because the customers would 
pay higher prices in periods of peak demand, and 
because drivers do not require more expensive 
commercial insurance or commercial licenses. For 
Airbnb we were able to show that these customers are 
more profitable because they do not require the 
expensive infrastructure of hotels, or in fact that they 
were not being served at all.   
This was also true of those examples in our larger 
data set where we believed that the SEPB was attack-
ing a newly vulnerable market. For example, the 
distribution of alcoholic beverages is a market that has 
existed for millennia, but Saucey serves customers 
(www.saucey.com/) who are willing to pay for effort-
less and immediate delivery of alcohol. Similarly, Just 
Park (www.justpark.com/)  serves customers willing 
to pay for effortless and immediate access to parking 
space. 
Finally, if SEPBs are to be seen as an attack on 
newly vulnerable markets we then need to demonstrate 
that the markets they are targeting are difficult for the 
established market participants to defend. This was 
easy to demonstrate for Uber and Airbnb. Taxi 
companies are prohibited from adopting the lower cost 
structure of Uber, and they cannot match supply and 
demand by adjusting prices or by bringing a large 
number of additional vehicles to match temporary 
supply shortages. Likewise, hotels are prohibited by 
regulation and zoning restrictions from matching the 
strategy of Airbnb hosts.   
This was also true of those examples in our larger 
data set where we believed that the SEPB was 
attacking a newly vulnerable market. 
We consider two examples from our SEPB startup 
database. Consider Postmates (www.postmates.com/), 
which attacks postal and parcel delivery companies, 
because regulations make it impossible for them to 
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match supply and demand by adjusting prices, and 
because they cannot bring a large number of additional 
employees to match temporary supply shortages. 
Similarly, LawTrades (www.lawtrades.com) attacks 
law firms, which cannot adjust their personnel 
resources to address temporary supply shortage or can-
not reduce the service prices since the firms have fixed 
costs.  
Thus, our assessment of Uber and Airbnb is 
consistent with our proposition that SEPBs attack 
newly vulnerable markets, and consistent with H3 
through H4.  More importantly, we were able to find 
support for H3 through H4 in our larger dataset. 
We explore the 44 (of the 67 in the sample) that we 
identified were attacking NVMs, to see the extent to 
which strategy determines information disclosure.  
Only one of them involved a risky decision, and that 
site did provide robust information. However, sample 
of one is too small for statistical testing, and we drop 
it from further analysis. 
Table 4 indicates which followed cost-based 
strategies and which followed differentiation-based 
strategies. Likewise, the table indicates which had 
structures that provided complete and robust 
information to enable consumer choice and which did 
not. We expect that websites that offer products and 
services that require an extreme level of trust will not 
observe that same simple provision of limited 
information that other cost-focused websites are able 
to deploy, but without a larger sample we cannot test 
this.  
Table 4. SEBPs which attack a NVM 
 
Strategy 






15 (88,2%)  2 (11,8%)  17 
Robust 
Information 
1 (3,7%) 26 (96,3%) 27 
Total  16 28 44 
Table 5 shows which of the 56 SEPB websites that 
we considered successful were attacking newly 
vulnerable markets. A chi-square test of independence 
was performed to examine the relation between 
SEPB’s success and attack of a NVM. The result was 
significant (X2 (1, N = 67) = 5,014, p <0.05), and 
supported H4. SEPBs which are considered successful 
are more likely to have attacked a NVM, while SEPBs 
which are not consider successful a less likely to have 
attacked a NVM. 
Table 5. SEBPs based on success and whether 
attacking a NVM 
 
Success 
No  Yes  Total  
NVM 
  
No  7 16 23 
Yes  4 40 44 
Total  11 56 67 
We should not be surprised to observe a lack of 
perfect correlation between matching strategy and 
structure and achieving initial success. Companies that 
create new markets can succeed as well, without 
attacking an existing newly vulnerable markets — 
social media is a prime example of this. Companies 
that create markets that do not appear vulnerable can 
still succeed because of superior products. Likewise, 
companies that initially appear successful when 
attacking stable markets may look good briefly and 
then collapse - many of the dot-com failures exemplify 
this well.   
Finally, we combine the internal consistency 
checks (H1A-H1C and H2) with the checks for 
attacking a newly vulnerable market (H3 and H4).  H5 
examines which successful SEPBs were attacking a 
newly vulnerable market and had strategy related to 
structure in the way we predicted.   
Table 6 shows our classification of the 40 SEPBs 
that were attacking newly vulnerable markets. The 
table indicates which followed cost-based strategies 
and which followed differentiation-based strategies. 
Likewise, the table indicates which had structures that 
provided complete and robust information to enable 
consumer choice and which did not.   
Table 6. SEBPs considered successful 
 
Strategy 






14 (87,5%) 2 (12,5%) 16 
Robust 
Information 
1 (4,2%) 23 (95,8%) 24 
Total  15 25 40 
A chi-square test of independence was performed 
to examine the relation between SEPB’s strategy and 
information provision to the platform participants. The 
result was significant (X2 (1, N = 40) = 28,444, p 
<0,01) and supported H5. Successful SEPBs that 
attack an NVM and that follow a cost-based strategy 
are less likely to provide robust information to their 
participants, while successful SEBPs that attack an 
NVM and that follow a differentiation-based strategy 
are more likely to provide robust information to the 
participants. 
6. Conclusions  
6.1 Limitations of the Current Study 
Our data sets are small. We are currently developing a 
larger data set of SEPBs for which we can determine 
strategy and structure, and for which we can assess 
success with a reasonable degree of accuracy.  This 
data set is being prepared by a research assistant with 
no other responsibility for  the project.  She is selecting 
as many SEPBs as she can locate, without preselecting 
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or prescreening them using any criteria related to our 
hypotheses.  This represents a first, but critical step, 
towards reducing selection bias in our study of an 
expanded sample.  Recall that our data set in this initial 
sample was selected by third parties, to ensure an 
absence of selection bias. 
 This larger data set will also be more comprehen-
sive, and will capture data like the age of a website.  
This will be useful in subsequent analyses, such as 
those that allow us to test whether matching strategy 
to structure is a characteristic of all websites, or rather 
is a characteristic of websites that survive. 
6.2 Managerial Implications 
If our results are robust and supported by future 
studies, they can provide guidance to incumbents who 
need to prepare for attack from SEPBs and who need 
guidance on how to prepare for attack. They can also 
provide guidance to entrepreneurs considering 
opportunities for new businesses and venture capital-
ists and private equity funds considering which oppor-
tunities are indeed promising enough to justify invest-
ment. 
 More precisely, we are saying two things here.  If 
our results are supported by future studies then inno-
vators considering launching an SEPB should careful-
ly match the structure of the website to the strategy be-
hind the selection of candidates for the service being 
offered.  Websites in support of resonance strategies 
should provide information-rich interfaces, while 
those in support of efficiency should provide less 
information.  We called this internal consistency.  
Moreover, since virtually all services in the sharing 
economy have an established traditional counter-part, 
innovators considering launching an SEPB should 
have a reason for anticipating success; that is, the 
established market they are attacking should be newly 
vulnerable.  We termed this external consistency. 
 These implications derive directly from out 
contribution to theory, below. 
6.3 Contributions to Theory 
The first two hypotheses make a small contribution to 
theory and they suggest that those websites that met 
the Money Nomad list of promising SEPBs illustrated 
an internal consistency. For those websites, strategy 
drives structure. The third and fourth hypotheses make 
an additional contribution. Since by definition sharing 
economy businesses share existing goods and services, 
they are likewise almost by definition attacking 
existing markets. Their designers and investors should 
have a reasonable theoretical basis to expect 
successful attack. The theory of NVM provides one 
such theory for predicting successful attack. 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 confirm that promising SEPBs are 
not only internally consistent with strategy matching 
structure, but they are also externally consistent with 
strategy matching existing market conditions. 
Finally, the fifth hypothesis may generate the 
most interesting results. Hypothesis 5 argues that 
successful SEPBs will be those that have attacked 
NVMs with structures that match their strategies. Our 
findings show that successful websites 
overwhelmingly exhibit internal and external 
consistency. Strategy of the firm drives the function of 
the website, which in turn drives the structure of the 
website and of the user interface. In brief, in a different 
context from Chandler’s [5], and at the level of product 
design rather than organizational structure, we find 
that structure is driven by strategy. Strategy is 
consistent with marketplace economics.  
What is significant is that we have developed simple 
tests for internal and external consistency. We show 
that not only are successful websites consistent with 
their marketplace (externally consistent) they are also 
internally consistent, in that design matches strategy. 
Successful websites satisfy both of our conditions for 
consistency.   
6.4 Suggestions for Future Research 
The most important suggestion is to repeat the 
research with a larger data set. This work has already 
started, with efforts to locate other curated lists of 
promising SEPBs, and to locate our own SEPBs that 
we consider promising. As before, an essential 
condition is that we avoid contaminating our data set 
through bias in our selection criteria, which would 
result in our including principally SEPBs whose 
strategy and structure are consistent with our 
hypotheses.  
Additionally, researchers would probably want to 
repeat the analyses several years later, when there will 
be a larger number of SEPBs for which success can 
unambiguously be demonstrated. It would also be 
interesting to see after a couple of years how many 
changes we would have in our classification of the 
successful websites on our list. 
When the research is conducted at a later time, 
two additional studies will be possible.  First, it is 
reasonable to expect that the sharing economy market-
place will have become much more crowded and much 
more competitive.  It is likely that the simple binary 
classification we used here — cost / efficiency based 
strategies and differentiation / resonance strategies, 
will have ceased to be fully effective.  More complex, 
hybrid strategies will probably have been adopted, and 
a more complex set of hypotheses will be required to 
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examine the more complex relationship between strat-
egy and structure that will have emerged.  Addition-
ally, some SEPBs will have failed, and we will be able 
to examine both surviving and failed websites to ascer-
tain whether lack of internal or external consistency 
was a significant contributor to website failure. 
Finally, other definitions of internal and external 
consistency may be useful in testing for different 
elements of website design or of interface design.  
These may be equally valid and may produce even 
stronger results or more useful insights. 
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apps-websites/ last accessed 05/21/2018. There were indeed 104 
websites included this list of 100 apps and websites.  
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